Leo A. Bird v. Clover Leaf-Harris Dairy : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1941
Leo A. Bird v. Clover Leaf-Harris Dairy : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Thatcher & Young; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation




OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEO A. BIRD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLOVER LEAF-HARRIS DAIRY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellant's Brief 
THATCHER & YOUNG, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
FI:bEtJ 
f·.f; A H % U 19 41 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
l'rtge 
Assignment of Errors·------------------------------------------------------·------------·-····---···· _______ 7 
Argument -------··--------------·----··------·--·-------·------·--------······-------------·-----·--·-----------------· 8 
Statement of Facts .............................................................................................. l 
LIS'l' OF CASES 
Bergnis vs California Oregon Power Company, 258 Pac. 680 .................. 14 
Butnick vs J. & M. Co., 59 P. 2nd, 750 ............................................................ 12 
Dobbie vs Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 273 Pac. 630 ... --·-----···-·-----····---··········12 
Denver vs Spencer, 82 Pac. 59 ......... ----·-·-------·--------------------------·-··-···--·-·-------~---22 
Garner vs Pacific Coast Coal C'o .. 100 P. 2nd, 32 ........................................ 14 
Gavin vs O'Connor, 122 Atl. 842 - 30 A. L. R. 138:L ............................... 12 
Hickman YS Sisters of Charity, 106 P. 2nd, 593. ......................................... 13 
Holm vs Investment & Securities Company, 79 P. 2nd, 708 .................... 15 
Jensen Ys Utah Railway Company, 72 Utah 366 - 270 Pac. 349 ............ 15 
Kinsman vs Barton & Company, 251 Pac. 563 ............................................ 12 
Kines vs Lang, 57 A. L. R. 1022.. ..................................................................... 15 
Kennedy vs Hawkins, 102 Pac. 733 ........ --------------------------------------------------------22 
Landers vs Brooks, 154 Northeaster 265 - 49 A. L. R. 562 ...................... 12 
Loney vs Laramie Auto Company, 255 Pac. 350 .......................................... 12 
Lyman vs Knickerbocker Theatre Company, 5 F. 2nd, 538 ...................... 22 
Nucek vs Weaver, 54 P. 2nd, 768 .................................................................... 22 
Pickwick Corporation vs Messinger, 36 P. 2nd, 168 .................................... 22 
Paul vs Salt Lake Ry. Co., 95 Pac. 363 .......................................................... 22 
Quinn vs Utah Gas & Coke Company, 42 Utah 113- 129 Pac. 362 ...... 14 
Robinson vs Leighton, 119 At. 809 - 30 A. L. R. 1326 .............................. 12 
Schock vs Ringling Brothers, 105 P. 2nd, 838 .............................................. 15 
White vs Pinney, 108 P. 2nd, 249 .................................................................... 17 
Winteroad vs Christensen, 68 Utah 546 - 251 Pac. 360 ... _ ....................... 14 
Zoccolillo vs Oregon Short Line, 177 Pac. 201 .............................................. 22 
45 c. J. 809 ....................... _ ..................................................................................... 13 
45 c. J. 788 ............................................................................................................ 13 
45 c. J. 812 ............................................................................................................ 13 
89 A. L. R. 757 ............................................................................... ·-····;··-·············15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEO A. BIRD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLOVER LEAF-HARRIS DAIRY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Defendant is the owner of a creamery plant at 723 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. It consists of several sep-
arate and disconnected buildings. The main building faces 
State Street, which is the processing plant, executive offices, 
etc., and is the place where all of the business is transacted. 
The buildings in the rear are adjuncts to the business. The 
first one back of the main building is a one story, brick build-
ing extending North and South from the South end of the lot 
to about the center. Immediately to the East is a two story 
building facing North (the building involved in this suit). 
The ground floor is used as a garage for company delivery 
trucks. The upper floor is used for storage purposes. Paral-
leling this building immediately to the North and facing South 
is another building known as the machine shops. The area 
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at times placed in the offending cars. Offenders were ap-
proached and told to remove their cars. Sometimes the cars 
were removed by the plant manager. Ample space was pro-
vided for them in the parking lot. 
The plant manager, pursuant to rules, made regular 
periodical inspection of all of the buildings and had done so 
for the last ten years. The last inspection preceding the acci-
dent was made about two months before March 6, 1939. At 
that time Mr. Galligher, the local manager, Mr. Myers, a com-
pany representative, and Mr. Johnson, the plant foreman, made 
a complete tour of all the buildings. They inspected the roof 
of the garage building, went over it thoroughly, looked for 
leaks or cracks, inspected the walls, floors, electrical wiring, 
looked for evidences of cracks or weaknesses in the walls and 
inspected the cement pillars. They discovered nothing to 
indicate anything unusual about the building or to suggest any 
inherent weaknesses. They saw no cracks in the wall. 
None of the officers or employees of the company knew 
of anything in or about the building, or the canopy, suggesting 
inherent weaknesses or need of repairs or replacements. 
When snow accumulated on the roof and canopy, men 
were sent to remove the same. As many as four men have 
frequently stood on the canopy and roof and shoveled heavy 
snow without any indication of weakness or excessive strain. 
On March 6, 1939, there was a small amount of snow 
and ice on the roof, not over two ( 2) inches, and not sufficient 
to require cleaning. 
Leo Montell Bird, plaintiff's son, was not an employee. 
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He was employed by the Milk Producers to take samples of 
their individual milk as delivered, in order to provide a means 
of checking with the company tests. His work was confined 
exclusively to the main building, where he came each morning, 
took his position near the scales and put a sample of each 
producer's milk in a separate bottle reserved for that purpose. 
It required about four hours each day for him to complete 
his samples. He had been thus employed for about one and 
one-half (1-0) years. However, his employment extended 
to various creameries and dairies in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
He did not carry his samples, so it was not necessary to use 
a car in his employment. He usually came on a bicycle, but 
occasionally his father would allow him the use of his car, 
usually on Sundays or at vacation periods. The car in question 
was a new Studebaker. None of the company officers knew 
this car and they paid little or no attention to his coming or 
going. l\1r. Johnson, the plant foreman, sometimes saw him 
come on his bicycle, which he frequently put in the garage. 
Sometimes he came in a coupe which he parked in the space re-
served adjacent to the \Vest wall of the brick building to the 
\Vest of the garage. On :J\11arch 6, 1939, he drove his father's 
new 1938 Studebaker car and placed the same under the 
canopy at the extreme vVestern end immediately in front of 
the double doors which were closed. He did not obtain per-
mission from anyone to park there. No company official or 
employee saw him drive his car there, nor did they know that 
this car belonged to him, nor did they observe the car there on 
the day of the accident, nor had they ever seen this car parked 
there before, although Mr. Bird claims to have parked it there 
several times. There is nothing to suggest that even had an 
employee seen the car, that he would have known it belonged 
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to l\1r. Bird. It might have belonged to some company official 
who might have the right to place it there. There was a truck 
and four ( 4) passenger cars under the East canopy but none, 
other than plaintiff's car, under the West canopy. As before 
noted, those on the East did not directly obstruct the opening 
into the garage, and cars or trucks were sometimes left there 
temporarily for repairs. 
On March 6, 1939, at about Eleven A. M., the West 
canopy and brick wall in the second story fell. This caused 
a heavy suction and the East canopy raised and then it fell, 
pulling the entire upper wall down. Whether the canopy fell 
before the wall or the wall before the canopy, is not known. 
No warning noises were heard and no opportunity was afford-
ed to remove any of the cars before the crash. No one knew 
what caused the accident, or how it happened. Reinforced 
concrete and brick are recognized as good building materials. 
Canopies in front of buildings are very common, and there was 
nothing in the form of construction of either to suggest weak-
nesses or strain, and the company was very careful in the 
inspection of its buildings. The canopy was constructed by 
the same contractor about one and one-half ( 1-0) years after 
the building was completed. The steel supporting rods were 
about eighteen ( 18) feet long, fastened to the reinforced con-
crete piers. 
There is no contention that defendant, or any of its agents, 
saw anything about the construction of the building or the 
canopy suggesting any inherent weakness, nor that there was 
anything which could have been observed that would have 
suggested weakness or strain in or about the building. 
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The car was damaged to the extent of Six Hundred Thirty 
Three and 77/100 Dollars ($633.77). 
Upon the foregoing evidence, all of which is undisputed, 
the trial court, sitting without a jury, made findings and en-
tered judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
Seven ( 7) errors have been assigned as follows: 
1. Error in overruling defendant's demurrer. 
2. Error in denying defendant's motion for a non suit. 
3. Error in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
4. Error in making a conclusion of law, 
"That the defendant's negligent acts or omission 
proximately causing damage to plaintiff's property, 
and that plaintiff recover damages for plaintiff and 
is entitled to judgment". 
5. Error in making that part of finding number Three ( 3), 




"a place where others had parked their automobiles". 
6. Error in making its finding number Four ( 4) 
"and while the plaintiff's automobile was parked by 
the aforesaid wall with the consent and permission of 
the defendant" 
"that defendant knew, or should have known, of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
also, 
8 
unsafe and unsound condition of said wall and that 
the damages to plaintiff's automobile were proximately 
caused as a result of the careless and negligent main-
tenance of said walls in an unsound and unsafe and 
dangerous condition" 
"and which was an instrumentality peculiarly exclusive 
and completely within the control and management 
of the said defendant". 
7. Error in failing to make findings; conclusions and enter 
judgment in favor of defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff, both by pleading and proof, attempted to bring 
himself within the Res Ipsa Loquitur doctrine. The trial court 
evidently decided this case on that theory. We believe we can 
argue all our assignments under this one general heading, as 
all questions involved both in the complaint, the findings, con-
clusion and judgment are of necessity involved in this question. 
Before embarking on a discussion of this subject, it is 
important to make some preliminary observations. It is, of 





and that the duty owed by the owner is measured by this re-
lationship. 
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Before discussing or applying the so called Res Ipsa Lo-
quitur doctrine, we must first determine the legal status of the 
parties as it applies to the automobile in question. 
If the boy, Leo l\Iontell Bird, had himself been injured 
while in the main building, there could be no denial of the 
fact that he was an invitee, but that is not this case. No in-
jury was sustained to the boy while in a place where he was 
invited. Rather, an injury happened to an automobile which 
was placed where it had no right to be. This fact must not be 
overlooked. l\Ierely because the defendant permitted him to 
come to its plant each day to take samples of milk and, to that 
extent, made him an invitee while in the plant does not mean 
that it invited him to drive his car in the rear and park the 
same where he had no right and, that by parking it there, the 
same relation was created with respect to the automobile. We 
say that by placing this car at the point indicated he was a 
trespasser with respect to the duty the defendant owed the 
owner in caring for the car, notwithstanding he was himself 
an invitee while engaged in his occupation in the main build-
ing; that if he was not a trespasser in placing the car at the 
point indicated, he was at most a mere licensee and under no 
circumstances was he an invitee. He generally came on a 
bicycle, so it cannot be said that the use of a car was in any 
sense a part of the invitation to come and sample milk. The 
defendant invited him to enter its main building each day and 
take samples of producer's milk. It did not invite him to drive 
an automobile in its back yard and, certainly, it never invited 
him to park the same immediately in front of its garage doors 
at a place where it did not even permit its own officers or 
employees to park. It provided parking space for anyone who 
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had occasion to visit the plant for legitimate purposes, if their 
employment was such as to be inconsistent with parking their 
automobiles in the public street. 
Plaintiff argues that because he had done this before, 
somehow he received a license to continue so to do. The dif-
ficulty with plaintiff's position rests in the fact that he failed 
to show any consent, express or implied, by any officer of the 
defendant company, which could bind the defendant. Plaintiff 
does not contend that the boy made a regular habit of parking 
there, or that he asked permission of anyone, irrespective of 
whether he had authority to give such consent to park there. 
He does not contend that any officer of the company saw him 
park there, or knew that this particular car was driven by the 
boy. He merely argues that, because some employees were 
at times permitted to park their cars under the East canopy, 
although in direct violation of company orders, therefore, he 
had a right to drive this car under the West canopy directly 
in front of the entrance doors to the garage, thereby obstructing 
ingress to or egress from the building and that, because he 
placed it there without the knowledge or consent of any official 
of the company and in direct violation of its rules and regula-
tions and at a place where anyone would know or readily per-
ceive it ought not to be placed; and that, notwithstanding the 
company had provided ample parking places for cars, yet be-
cause someone did not box t~e boy's ears and order him to 
get the car out, irrespective of the authority of such person, 
that somehow the defendant company owed the same duty 
toward the protection of the car that it owed the boy while 
lawfully in the building sampling milk. This seems to be a 
strange conception of the law. 
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Suppose, for argument sake, some employee did see Mr. 
Leo 1\:lontell Bird drive the car there, although this is denied 
and not proved, would such knowledge on the part of some 
mere employee, without protest on his part, be sufficient to 
create implied consent on the part of the defending company? 
Would it not be incumbent upon plaintiff to show that officers 
of the company who had authority to expressly bind it knew 
of such condition and impliedly consented thereto? No such 
attempt was made to bind the company in this case. Suppose 
that someone did see a Studebaker car standing in front of 
this garage, but he did not know who owned the car or who 
drove it there. Would that fact be sufficient to authorize a 
finding that the defendant had impliedly invited this boy to 
park his car in that vicinity? 
The mere statement of the facts demonstrate the utter 
absurdity of the position. Had this boy been driving this par-
ticular automobile over a period of years and had he placed 
the same regularly at this position, there might be some merit 
to his contention, but here the evidence showed that the boy 
usually rode a bicycle; that he had on previous occasions 
driven an old Ford car which he parked in the place allotted, 
and that this was a new Studebaker car which his father had 
permitted him to drive on a few occasions, generally on a Sun-
day. There was no showing that any officer of this company 
ever saw him drive this car. Does, therefore, the mere presence 
of this Studebaker car at the point indicated, whether known 
to some employee or not, charge the defendant company with 
the responsibility of protecting this car against all hazards? 
\Vhat is its responsibility? It is well established that a person 
may be an invitee as to one part of the building, yet a trespas-
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ser as to some other part? The subject is discussed in the fol-
lowing case: 
Loney vs Laramie Auto Company 
255 Pac. 350 
While in this case the court held that plaintiff was an invitee 
with respect to the place of injury, yet the court recognizes 
the rule and says: 
"The liability of the keeper of premises and the right 
of protection of an invitee may, of course, be a limited 
one and cannot go beyond the invitation. There are 
many cases to that effect, many of them holding that 
an invitee goes beyond the scope of, and violates, the 
invitation when he goes into some part of the premises 
where he is not invited, and where the purpose of his 
visit do not warrant him to go. The duty to protect an 
invitee is necessarily coextensive with the invitation, 
though no further." 
See also the following cases discussing the same rule: 
Kinsman vs Barton and Company 
251 Pac. 563 
Gavin vs O'Connor 
122 Atl. 842-30 A. L. R. 1383 
Robinson vs Leighton 
119 Atl. 809 - 30 A. L. R. 1326 
Landers vs Brooks 
154 Northeastern 265 - 49 A. L. R. 562 
Butnick vs J. & M., Inc. 
59 P. 2nd 750 
Dobbie vs Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 
273 Pac. 630 
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The courts sometimes refer to the situation as that of ex-
ceeding the bounds of permission to enter upon the owner's 
premises. See, for instance, 
Hickman vs Sisters of Charity 
106 P. 2nd 593 
That is precisely what we claim in this case. While the boy 
had the right to enter the main building and (it might be well 
argued) that he had the right to park his car at places provided 
for parking, yet he certainly exceeded the bounds of any invita-
tion, express or implied, when, without permission and in viola-
tion of company rules, he put his car at the point in question. 
The question of who are invitees is discussed in 45 C. J. 
commencing at Page 809, Section 220 and continues to Page 
788. It is, of course, impracticable to cite the cases or to quote 
from the text. However, we specifically call the court's at-
tention to Page 812 wherein the author discusses "circum-
stances not amounting to an invitation" in the following 
language: 
"Use of premises without the owner's knowledge or oc-
casional use in disregard of the owner's apparent in-
tentions, cannot give the user the status of an invitee. 
Neither does the mere fact that a certain use of prop-
erty is confined to the user give rise to an implication 
of an invitation to make such use of it". 
In 45 C. J., Page 788, Section 194, the author discusses 
who are licensees and shows the distinction between a licensee 
and an invitee. 
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What then was the duty which the defendant, as owner 
of the premises, owed to the plaintiff, the owner of the auto-
mobile placed as it was in front of the company garage? This 
duty depends upon whether the relationship is that of tres-
passer, licensee or invitee. The cases are legion which discuss 
this duty and differentiate between the three situations. This 
court, in accord with many other states, holds that where the 
person is an invitee, the owner or occupant of the premises 
owes him a duty of reasonable or ordinary care to keep prem-
ises in a safe and suitable condition so that he will not be un-
necessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger. 
Winteroad vs Christensen 
68 Utah 546 
251 Pac. 360 
Quinn vs Utah Gas & Coke Company 
42 Utah 113 
129 Pac. 362 
On the other hand, it is universally held that the owner of 
premises is not an insurer of the safety of its invitees. It is 
equally well settled that as to a licensee, the owner or occupant 
of land owes only the duty of not wilfully or wantonly 
injuring him. 
Garner vs Pacific Coast Coal Company 
100 P. 2nd, 32 
Dobbie vs Pacific Gas & Electric Company 
273 Pac. 630 
Borgnis vs California Oregon Power Company 
258 Pac. 630 
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Buttnick vs J. & M., Inc. 
59 Po. 2nd, 7 50 
Schock vs Ringling Brothers 
105 P. 2nd, 838 
Holm vs Investment & Securities Company 
79 P. 2nd, 708 
Kines vs Lang 
57 A. L. R. 1022 
On the other hand, if there is any distinction between 
the duty owed to a trespasser and that of a lic~nsee, the duty 
would be still less toward a trespasser. 
Jensen vs Utah Railway Company 
72 Utah 366 
270 Pac. 349 
lays down the rule that the only duty owed a trespasser is to 
use care after the presence of the trespasser is actually discov-
ered. The subject is annotated in 
89 A. L. R. at Page 757 
and the note refers to previous annotations. 
From the foregoing authorities, it is clear, we think, that 
the duty resting upon the defendant in this case is dependent 
on the status of the plaintiff's property but, in no event, does 
the defendant owe a greater duty even toward an invitee than 
that of reasonable care. 
Our first assignment of error challenges the sufficiency 
of plaintiff's complaint. We contend that the court erred in 
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overruling our demurrer for the reason that plaintiff's com-
plaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show that the auto-
mobile in question was placed at the point indicated at the in-
vitation, express or implied, of the defendant and, if it does 
not allege facts sufficient to create the relationship of invitee, 
then the complaint does not state a cause of action because it 
shows no breech of duty toward a licensee or trespasser. 
Assignment Number Two attacks the ruling of the court 
in denying defendant's motion for a nonsuit. This matter 
may be reserved for further consideration in connection with 
the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. However, at this point, we 
call the court's attention to the fact that the plaintiff's evi-
dence failed to show that the defendant owed the plainiff, 
or his automobile the duty of an invitee. The most that can be 
said of the evidence presented by the plaintiff was that in 
placing the car at the point in question, the relationship was 
either that of a trespasser or, at most, a mere licensee, and, 
if such was the relationship, how can it be argued that there 
was any evidence, even under the Res Ipsa Loquitur doctrine, 
to even suggest a wilfull or wanton act on the part of the de-
fendant? We contend that when the plaintiff rested without 
offering evidence sufficient in law to show the status of an 
invitee, that the court should have granted the motion for a 
non suit. 
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
Counsel contends, and the court seemed to have adopted 
his contention, that under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur 
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the court was justified in inferring negligence. The last case 
to be decided by this court on the subject is that of 
\Yhite vs Pinney 
108 P. 2nd, 249 
in which Mr. Justice Larson very carefully reviews the author-
ities and discusses this rule. It is our belief that this case 
effectively disposes of this question and demonstrates why a 
judgment should have been entered in favor of the defendant. 
As stated by him, 
''The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur is that when a thing 
which causes injury is shown to be under the exclusive 
control of the defendant and the injury is such as in 
the ordinary course of things does not occur if the one 
having such control uses proper care, the happening 
of the accident is evidence sufficient to justify an in-
ference that defendant did not exercise due and proper 
care, the effect of the doctrine being evidentiary. 
Where plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for 
recovery for injury caused by alleged neglect of de-
fendant, defendant may escape liability by showing 
that defendant exercised all the care commensurate 
with the damages to be apprehended, which careful 
and prudent men would have exercised under the cir-
cumstances. Where plaintiff has made out a prima 
facie case for recovery under Res Ipsa Loquitur doc-
trine, the burden of going forward with the evidence 
shifts to the defendant to show that he was not guilty 
of negligence." 
In this case, the plaintiff merely proved the ownership of 
the automobile, the ownership of the premises by defendant, 
the nature of the boy's employment, the placing of the car at 
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the point indicated, the falling of the wall, the resulting dam-
age, and then rested. If he made out a prima facie case under 
the theory of this doctrine, against whom did he make out a 
prima facie case? Did he make out such a case in favor of a 
trespasser or a licensee, or even an invitee? Is there any pre-
sumption under this doctrine that the defendant acted wilfully 
or wantonly, as is required to recover in case of a trespasser 
or licensee? Did the plaintiff make out a prima facie case 
that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in not 
discovering the weakness in the wall, or, putting it another 
way, did the happening of the event justify an inference that 
the building was weak, that the defendant knew, or ought to 
have known, it was weak or, in case of a licensee, that it wil-
fully and wantonly injured the plaintiff's property? However 
this may be, as we understand the doctrine, if plaintiff did 
make out a prima facie case from which a court might infer 
liability as against either an invitee, licensee or trespasser, 
then it became the duty of the defendant to go forward and 
make explanation. This the defendant did and the evidence 
is not in any way disputed. What, then, did the defendant 
prove? It was proved: 
1. That the building was constructed twenty years 
ago by a building contractor and it was constructed 
out of reinforced concrete and brick, the usual and 
proper method of building buildings. 
2. That the building was in a good state of repair and 
that there were no patent defects which would be 
discovered by an inspection. 
thereby clearly distinguishing the situation from that pre-
sented to the court in the case of Winterroad vs Christensen, 
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cited supra, where the court calls attention to the fact that the 
board in the platform which gave way was decomposed and 
its condition could clearly be seen by inspection, and the court 
uses the following language: 
"The particular fact of controlling importance is 
whether from the circumstances it can be fairly in-
ferred that a reasonable inspection by defendant would 
have discovered the defect." 
3. That within two months prior to the accident, the 
defendant inspected the building and found nothing 
to indicate any weakness or anything to suggest a 
dangerous condition. 
4. That the canopy was properly and securely braced 
and supported by steel rods extending from the top 
of the building. 
5. That the defendant removed the snow off the roof 
whenever there was any appreciable accumulation; 
and that on the day of the accident there was only 
a small amount of snow on the roof. 
6. That the defendant, or its officers or employees, 
did not know what caused the accident. 
As above noted, none of these facts are disputed. What 
then is the situation? Assume that the plaintiff has made out 
a prima facie case under this evidentiary rule, but the defend-
ant then goes forward and proves by clear and convincing 
evidence facts which in law would exonerate it from any liabil-
ity. Can the court disregard those facts which are in no way 
disputed and still infer a breach of duty? Here again we de-
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sire, even at the expense of repetition, to remind the court 
that the defendant is not an insurer of the safety of its guests. 
Neither is it an insurer that its building will not fall. It is 
merely required to show, even as against an invitee, that it 
exercised reasonable care for the safety of its guests and, if it 
discharges this obligation, even though an accident happens 
and even though the same cannot be explained, can a court, 
after a full explanation, infer not the fact that the building was 
weak, not the fact that the building jell, but the further fact 
that the defendant knowingly maintained upon its premises 
a building which was in an unsafe or dangerous condition, or 
that there were facts which could be discovered by reasonable 
care from which the owner could have learned of the unsafe 
or dangerous condition? Therein it seems to us is the vice of 
the court's ruling and the danger of a literal application of the 
doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. By resorting to this evidentiary 
presumption, the court has in effect said, notwithstanding you 
have made full explanation; notwithstanding your evidence 
stands uncontradicted; and, notwithstanding the fact that this 
building was properly constructed, was in an apparently safe 
condition, was not an old delapidated building; and, notwith-
standing the fact that you made regular inspections and did 
not discover its dangerous condition, yet, I hold that, because 
the building fell, therefore, it was inherently weak and you 
should have known it and you are liable, not because you knew 
or should have known of the dangerous condition, but you are 
liable because the building, having fallen, must have been in a 
dangerous and unsafe condition. Is this not akin to holding 
that the owner of premises is an absolute guarantor of the 
safety of persons upon the premises, irrespective of the re-
lationship? Is it not an application of the doctrine of main-
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taining a dangerous instrumentality upon ones premises? Does 
it not in effect amount to a holding that if a building falls, and 
the cause thereof cannot be satisfactorily explained as being 
due to some catastrophe, that the owner is liable for the con-
sequences? Does it not amount to this, that the so called rule 
of Res Ipsa Loquitur, which is only a presumptive evidentiary 
rule, change itself into a rule of absolute liability and become 
a rule of substantive law, rather than evidence? \Vhy, may I 
ask, should the application of this doctrine enlarge the liability 
of an owner or occupant of property? If this judgment can 
be sustained, then we say that, as a result of this fiction, the 
owner of property becomes an insurer; that no matter how 
careful one may be in employing competent men to erect a 
building, and no matter how careful he may subsequently be 
in keeping the building in proper repair and in making inspec-
tion, yet he is at all times liable to any person who may be on 
his property, should the building collapse, even though he did 
not nor, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have 
known that the building was weak or inherently dangerous. 
\V e do not think it necessary or proper to cite the many 
cases involving this doctrine. We admit its application in 
proper cases. We think it is salutary in requiring defendant 
to go forward and make satisfactory explanation, but we do 
not think citation of cases will be very helpful with respect to 
these particular facts. In fact, we have searched diligently 
through the books but have not been able to find a case which 
supports the position of the plaintiff. 
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We cite the following cases without further discussion: 
Zoccolillo vs Oregon Short Line 
177 Pac. 201 
Paul vs Salt Lake Railway Company 
95 Pac. 363 
Denver vs Spencer 
82 Pac. 59 
Kennedy vs Hawkins 
102 Pac. 733 
Nucek vs Weaver 
54 P. 2nd, 768 
wherein the court uses the following language: 
"Where presumption of negligence of defendant arises 
from the happening of an accident defendant assumes 
the burden of advancing evidence not to satisfactorily 
account for the accident and to show the actual cause 
of injury, but merely to rebut inference that he has 
failed to use due care." 
Lyman vs Knickerbocker Theatre Company 
5 F. 2nd, 538 
Pickwick Corporation vs Messinger 
36 P. 2nd, 168 
Assignment of Error Number Four attacks the conclusion 
of law that the defendant's negligent acts or ommissions 
caused the damage. Wherein is there any evidence of negli-
gent acts on the part of the defendant? What acts or omis-
sions did the defendant do? 
We also attack that part of finding Number Three, As-
signment Five, where the court found that the boy parked the 
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car at a place where others had parked their automobiles. 
There is no evidence that others parked their cars at the point 
in front of the garage door where the boy parked his but, even 
though there is such evidence that the company permitted 
employees to do this, does this justify a guest doing the same 
thing? 
Also we challenge that part of finding Number Four 
where the court found that the automobile was parked with 
the consent and permission of defendant and that defendant 
know, or should have known, of the unsafe and unsound con-
~ition of said wall. Here again we repeat what we have said 
before that to make such a finding is equivalent to the court 
refusing to believe uncontradicted testimony. There may be 
an inference that the wall was unsafe but there certainly can 
be no inference that the defendant knew, or should have 
known, the unsafe condition. 
We submit that the complaint does not state a cause of 
action; that the court should have granted defendant's motion 
for a non suit; that, in any event, those portions of the find-
ings attacked can find no support in the evidence that the 
judgment cannot be supported from the findings or the law 
applicable thereto; that the cause should be reversed with 
instructions to dismiss the complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THATCHER & YOUNG, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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